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Note
Tawdry Tales: The Psychological Underpinnings of
Corruption and Gifts to Public Officials
MICHAEL J. PACIOREK
Corruption today often involves the sale of access, positioning the buyer in a
prime position to influence governmental decision making. The prosecution of
Robert McDonnell, who admittedfacilitating the sale of such access for gifts and
loans from Jonnie Williams, depended on the definition of "official action."
Emphasizing the "quo" of a quid pro quo exchange, the Supreme Court vacated
McDonnell's conviction because he did not take an "official action" even though
he arrangedmeetings, encouragedsubordinatesto act, and hosted a party for the
launch of Williams's product at the Governor's mansion. This Note identifies the
Court's dramatic shfit towards narrowing bribery to explicit quid pro quo
transactions and argues that soft, or implicit, quid pro quo arrangements are
equally corrupting. The reciprocity norm operates like an unspoken social
contract, obligatingrecipients of gifts and favors to reciprocate, even without an
agreed-upon exchange. Furthermore,politicians are socialized by their political
environment towards reciprocating behavior. The Court erred by not
acknowledging the psychological realities associated with the flow of gifts from
Williams to McDonnell. This Note proposes a broader definition of "official
action" and the framework surrounding it to better protect against subtle
corruption by erecting structuralbarriers.
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Tawdry Tales: The Psychological Underpinnings of
Corruption and Gifts to Public Officials
MICHAEL J. PACIOREK*
INTRODUCTION
Politicians face numerous statutory and regulatory burdens, often
aimed at increasing transparency and trust among the electorate.'
Ultimately, these statutes aim to curb corruption of public officials, which
includes more than the traditional image of quid pro quo bribery.2 Most
bribery statutes include the same five elements or variations of them: "(1)
giving a thing of value or a benefit (2) to a public official or candidate (3)
corruptly (4) with intent to influence (5) an official action." 3 The
conviction of former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell hinged on the
definition of "official action." McDonnell believed that his conviction
would "be the only one in which a public official has ever been found
guilty of bribery not for promising to himself influence the exercise of
governmental power, but for merely facilitating access so that a third party
could attempt to do so." 4 This explanation should at least raise concern
because he was essentially acting as a paid lobbyist.'

.University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2018; University of Connecticut, B.A.
2015. 1 would like to thank Professor Douglas Spencer for his insightful feedback and guidance; the
members of the Connecticut Law Review for their comments and meticulous editing; and Lara
Reynolds for her support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Mark Wasielewski, Peter
Lewandowski, and Brian O'Dowd at the Connecticut Office of State Ethics for providing the
inspiration for this Note. Finally, I thank my parents, Peter and Jill Paciorek, for their love and support.
' See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S SNUFF Box

TO CITIZENS UNITED 3 (2014) ("Americans started their experiment in self-government committed to
expanding the scope of the actions that were called corrupt.. . . Americans felt the need to constitute a
political society with civic virtues and a deep commitment to representative responsiveness at the core.
They enlisted law to help them do it. , . .").
2 See id. at 276 (defining corruption to include "excessive private interest in the exercise of public
power" and "a range of self-serving behaviors").
3
Id. at 217.
4Reply Memorandum of Defendant at 2, United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S.
Dist. WL 6772486, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014).
5 See TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 145 ("[Lobbyists] then determine what their clients want:
sometimes stopping a law or regulation, sometimes changing tax laws, sometimes receiving a subsidy.
They then figure out how to enable a series of actions that do not operate like quid pro quo exchanges
but allow for the flow from client to candidate, and from politician to client, while taking a fee for
enabling the flow, and obscuring the transaction-like elements by submerging them in other,
nontransactional elements.").
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In McDonnell v. United States,6 the Supreme Court ensured that
politicians will not need to worry about accepting lavish gifts of cash and
Rolex watches so long as they adhere to the new definition of "official
action."' The opinion has rightfully drawn the ire of some citizens who
view the Court's opinion as an acceptance of Robert McDonnell's behavior
as the new political norm.' In addition, critics believe the Court is limiting
the political safeguards one by one with assurances that another statute is
better suited to handle the case before it.' Furthermore, after the Fourth
Circuit upheld the convictions of Robert and his wife, Maureen
McDonnell, the noted anticorruption scholar Zephyr Teachout wrote, "[t]o
overturn the McDonnells' convictions, however, would also overturn more
than 700 years of history, make bad law and leave citizens facing a crisis
of political corruption with even fewer tools to fight it.""o The foundational
concept is that politicians should not be compensated by private citizens, in
addition to their salary, to perform the duties of their civil-service
positions." Permitting public officials to receive additional compensation
from private citizens mcentivizes the public official to place the needs of
the paying constituent before those of the constituents who cannot afford to
purchase the official's service. It also corrupts the public official who
instead of acting in the best interests of his or her constituents as a group
will prioritize the interests of those few who are willing to bribe for

6 136

S. Ct. 2355 (2016).

See id. at 2368 ("[The] two requirements for an 'official act': First, the Government must
identify a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy' that 'may at any time be pending'

or 'may by law be brought' before a public official. Second, the Government must prove that the public
official made a decision or took an action 'on' that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or
controversy, or agreed to do so."). The Court interpreted the first requirement's language to "connote a
formal exercise of governmental power, such as a lawsuit, hearing, or administrative determination."

Id.

I See e.g., Zephyr Teachout,

There'sNo Such Thing as a FreeRolex, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016),

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/opinion/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-free-rolex.html
[https://
perma.cc/BDG6-RHPN] (criticizing the Court's fear of criminalizing "what they perceived as normal,
day-to-day political behavior" instead of curtailing corruption).

9 See id. (stating that the Citizens United decision was prefaced with an understanding that federal
bribery statutes were the correct avenue to remove money from politics).
0

Id.

" See Charles F.C. Ruff, FederalProsecution of Local Corruption:A Case Study in the Making

of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1179 (1977) ("A comparable offense appeared in
England as early as 1275. Chapter 26 of the Statute of Westminster 1, entitled 'Extortion by the King's
Officers,' provided in part that 'no Sherriff, nor other the King's Officer, take any reward to do his
Office, but shall be paid of that which they take of the King; and he that so doth, shall yield twice as
much, and shall be punished at the King's Pleasure."') (quoting The Statute of Westminster, the First,
1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 26 (Eng.) (repealed 1968)); see also TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 60-62 (discussing
Benjamin Franklin's radical proposal that public officials not receive any compensation for their
service).

2017]1
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priority service. 12
In a narrow reading of what constitutes "official action," the Supreme
Court hamstrung the ability of federal prosecutors to rid political offices of
quid pro quo corruption.13 The most egregious corruption, such as the
outright exchange of government contracts for cash, is still sufficiently
protected by the McDonnell v. United States interpretation of "official
action."l 4 The Court was concerned that, without some constraint, "official
action" would expand to encompass almost any action of a public official,
which would result in "absurdities of convicting individuals on corruption
charges."" One such absurd example would be prosecuting the President
or a governor for hosting the NCAA championship basketball team at the
White House, which is part a longstanding tradition dating back to 1865.16
This Note aims find a balance between the evils envisioned by those
on either side of the question: permitting the sale of political access and
holding politicians at the mercy of prosecutors. Such balance requires
creating a bright-line definition of "official action" that incorporates the
psychological realities of relationships that revolve around exchanges. The
Court erred in drawing a distinction between a public official offering to
vote one way for money and lobbying within the government to support
the donor's position. Robert McDonnell may not have performed an
"official act" in the Court's opinion, but he was lobbying for pay without
the sort of prophylactic measures applicable to lobbyists or campaign
finance.
Section I will explore the factual background and briefly track the
prosecution of Robert and Maureen McDonnell to demonstrate how the
Court has approved a pay-to-play approach. Additionally, this Note will
trace the modern definition of "official action" through several Supreme
Court iterations. This Note will apply the contemporary definition of
"official action" to older precedent to illustrate the shortcomings in
application of the McDonnell iteration.
Section II will discuss in depth the deficiency of the McDonnell
opinion's narrow definition of "official action." One of the key
12 See TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 2-3 (discussing how gifts can encourage diplomats to put the
private interest ofthe gift-giver above the public interest their position represents).
'3 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016) (curtailing the definition of
"official action" to situations involving the formal exercise of government authority over a specific

question).
" See id. at 2370 (describing situations where there would be an official act such as narrowing
down a list of candidates for a research grant).
" See id (refusing to include "setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling another official"

within the definition ofofficial action).
" See Thomas Neumann, Why White House Visits by Champions Are a U.S. Tradition, ESPN

(Mar.

1, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story//id/14870667/how-white-house-visits-

championship-teams-became-american-tradition

[https://perma.cc/824J-993S]

history of White House visits by championship-winning athletic teams).

(providing

a

brief
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shortcomings of the Court's approach is that it fails to appreciate the
psychology undergirding the relationship between the briber, Jonnie
Williams, and Robert McDonnell. 7 The reciprocity norm theorizes that it
is a fundamental aspect of human nature to desire to reciprocate when
receiving gifts and favors."
Section III will compare campaign finance laws to bribery laws to
demonstrate the greater risks associated with in-office contributions and
valuable aspects of campaign finance laws that should be applied to inoffice corruption. Campaign finance is more regulated and transparent than
unreported gifts, vacations, and money flowing through private channels to
elected officials. In addition, incumbent public officials are more
susceptible to gift-giving unduly influencing their decision-making process
because of clientelism. Lastly, the emphasis of campaign finance
regulation on structural barriers to prevent corruption is more effective
than reactive anticorruption laws.'"
Section IV will attempt to lay out a standard that the Court could have
adopted in McDonnell that would have more accurately reflected the
underlying psychology, and corrupting influence, of public officials
receiving gifts. Additionally, this Note suggests that maximum sentences
be graduated with the amount corruptly received by the public official.
This, in tandem with a more inclusive definition of "official action," would
create a structural barrier to dissuade corruption by reducing the incentive
towards corrupt practices.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Case Summary
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Robert McDonnell placed
economic development at the forefront of his campaign for Governor of
Virginia. 20 The McDonnell campaign emphasized that "Bob's for jobs" 2 1
and received widespread support from businesses.22 During the election,
" See Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm ofReciprocity: A PreliminaryStatement, 25 AM. Soc. REV.

161, 171 (1960) (suggesting that the norm of reciprocity requires individuals to "help those who have
helped them" and "not injure those who have helped them").
" See id. (stating that reciprocity is "no less universal and important an element of culture than
the incest taboo").
19 See infra Section III.B.
20 See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 486 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that McDonnell's
campaign focused on Virginia's economy), vacated by 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
21 McDonnell Speech: Bob's for Jobs, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 30, 2012, 1:00 AM),
http://www.richmond.com/news/article_4c9ab80a-f434-5710-8856-7ac46818ea93.html
[https://perma.cc/UJ9Y-FSRF].
22 See Anita Kumar, McDonnell Snags More Business Support, WASH. POST: VA. POLITICS (Sept.
18, 2009, 4:59 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/virginiapolitics/2009/09/post_351.html
[https://perma.cc/622L-2VSD] (listing 229 of Robert McDonnell's business donors).
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the McDonnell family was in the midst of a financial crisis. McDonnell
was hemorrhaging money from his failing rental properties,23 the loan
payments on which totaled $11,000 per month.24 In addition, Robert and
Maureen McDonnell's credit card debt was growing at an unsustainable
rate. 25 As a result, McDonnell and his wife were arguably more susceptible
to less scrupulous financial donors.26 Jonnie Williams, the CEO of Star
Scientific Inc., was the donor willing and able to provide desperatelyneeded financial support to the McDonnell family. 27 This financial
assistance came in several forms: direct personal loans,28 lavish shopping
trips on Fifth Avenue in New York City,2 9 and even the McDonnells's use
of Williams's Ferrari at Williams's vacation home.30 These were ongoing
financial subsidies that Williams provided to the McDonnell family which
allowed them to continue enjoying a luxurious lifestyle.31
All of this came to light only after the McDonnells accused their
executive chef of stealing groceries from the pantry to use in his private
catering business. 3 2 In response to the allegations, the chef turned over
23

See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 486 ("Mobo Real Estate . . . a business operated by [McDonnell]

and his sister, was losing money on a pair of beachfront rental properties . . . . When [McDonnell]

became Governor, he and his sister were losing more than $40,000 each year.").
24 Id.
25 See id. (noting that at the time of his inauguration, their credit card debt was $74,000 which

would balloon to over $90,000 within the first year of holding office).
26 See Indictment at 10, United States v. McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 6772486 (E.D. Va. Dec.
1, 2014) (No. 3:14-CR-12) (showing that at the time of the first loan Maureen McDonnell had
approximately $4,798 in her checking account). But cf Alissa Smith, McDonnell Among Top 5 Highest
Paid Governors, VIRGINIAWATCHDOG (Apr. 13, 2011), http://watchdog.org/34734/vashn-mcdonnell-

among-top-5-highest-paid-governors/ [https://perma.cc/TB62-WQAB] (stating that as Governor of
Virginia, Robert McDonnell was one of the highest paid governors in the nation).
27

McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 488 ("Then, according to Williams, Mrs. McDonnell said, '1 have a

background in nutritional supplements and I can be helpful to you with this project, with your

company. The Governor says it's okay for me to help you and-but I need you to help me. I need you
to help me with this financial situation .... Williams called [Robert McDonnell] .. .. 'I called him and
said that, you know, 'I met with Maureen. I understand the financial problems and I'm willing to

help."') (internal citations omitted); see McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2016)
(stating that the McDonnells received $175,000 from Jonnie Williams in the form of loans, gifts, and
other compensation).

See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 488 ("Mrs. McDonnell asked to borrow $50,000.").
See id. ("Williams spent approximately $20,000 on Mrs. McDonnell during [their New York
City] shopping spree.").
3o See id. at 489 ("[McDonnell] and his family vacationed at Williams's multi-million-dollar
28

29

vacation home at Smith Mountain Lake in Virginia. Williams allowed the McDonnells to stay there
free of charge. . . . [Williams] paid more than $600 to have his Ferrari delivered to the home for

[Robert McDonnell's] use.").
31 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct at 2364 (stating that the total of gifts and loans exceeded $175,000);
see also McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 492 (quoting an email from Maureen McDonnell to Robert

McDonnell's chief counsel: "Gov wants to know why nothing has developed w studies after Jonnie
gave $200,000") (internal citations omitted).

n Rosalind S. Helderman & Matt Zapotosky, 'No One Won in This,' Says Chef Who Sparked
McDonnell Case, WASH.

POST (Sept.

3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-
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information revealing the financial relationship between Williams and the
McDonnell family.3 3
Robert McDonnell's indictment consisted of fourteen counts, including
honest-services wire fraud and Hobbs Act extortion." Under the Hobbs
Act, the prosecutor had to show that the "defendant's extortion
'obstruct[ed], delay[ed], or affect[ed] commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce.""' The federal mail and wire fraud
statutes criminalize the deprivation of the citizens' "intangible right of
honest services."" The unusual wording had drawn the ire of Justice
Scalia, who criticized the vagueness and breadth of the statute."
The prosecution alleged that five official acts had taken place." The
five alleged official acts were:
An August 1, 2011 meeting arranged by Robert McDonnell
between Jonnie Williams, Maureen McDonnell, and Molly
Huffstetler, a senior policy advisor to the Virginia Secretary
of Health to discuss research and available research grants to
study Anatabloc[, a supplement derived from tobacco and
manufactured by Williams's company,] at the University of
Virginia and the Virginia Commonwealth University Medical
Center.39
An August 30, 2011 party hosted by Robert and Maureen
McDonnell at the Governor's Mansion.4 0 Each of the tables
at the party contained samples of the Anatabloc product and
the guest list was approved by Jonnie Williams. 4 ' The guests
included officials from the University of Virginia and
Virginia Medical School.4 2 At this event, Robert McDonnell
pitched further studies regarding Anatabloc while Jonnie
Williams provided $25,000 grant checks to interested

politics/chef-who-sparked-mcdonnell-case-watches-for-verdict/2014/09/03/f309a44a-3373-1
0899b306bbea story.html [https://perma.cc/W975-9NRL].

I e4-9e92-

33 Id.
1 Indictment at 1, United States v. McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 6772486 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1,
2014) (No. 3:14-CR-12).
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012); United States v. McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 6772486, at *7.
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
3 Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1204-05 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing unusual
applications of the honest-services fraud statute).
3 McDonnell, 2014 WL 6772486, at *3.
3 Indictment at 14-15, United States v. McDonnell, 2014 WL 6772486 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014)
(No. 3:14-CR-12).
4 Id. at 17.

41 Id.
42 Id.

1307

TA WDR Y T4LES

2017]

researchers.43
Jason Eige, Robert McDonnell's Counselor and Senior
Policy Advisor, received an email from McDonnell on
February 17, 2012 asking him to see him about the status of
research studies of Anatabloc at the University of Virginia
and Virginia Commonwealth University Medical Center.44
Prior to Robert McDonnell's email, Maureen McDonnell was
pressuring Jason Eige to contact Jonnie Williams, emailing
that "[Governor McDonnell] wants to know why nothing has
developed w[ith] studies after [Williams] gave $200,000."45
On February 29, 2012, the McDonnells hosted a reception for
healthcare leaders at the Governor's Mansion. 46 Jonnie
Williams and other Star Scientific representatives attended
the reception.47
On March 21, 2012 Robert McDonnell met with the
Secretary of Administration Lisa Hicks-Thomas and her staff
member Sara Wilson about Virginia's state employee health
plan.48 One of the topics discussed was how to curb
healthcare costs. 49 At one point, McDonnell "pulled some
Anatabloc out of his pocket and told [Lisa Hicks-Thomas]
and [Sara Wilson] that Anatabloc had beneficial health
effects . . . ."'o McDonnell then asked them to "reach out to

.

the 'Anatabloc people' and meet with them. .

At trial, the jury linked these actions to an implicit quid pro quo based
on the testimony of Williams and McDonnell.5 2 "Official action" has been
interpreted as including activities outside the duties of a public official to
reach customary functions." Testimony of McDonnell's staff revealed that
"McDonnell would customarily take action on questions, matters, and
causes of Virginia business and economic development, including hosting

43

Id at 18.

44 Id at 24.
45 Id

Id. at 25.
** Id
46

48 Id. at 26.
49 Id.

51 Id.
52 See United States v. McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 6772486, at *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014)
(No. 3:14-CR-12) (noting evidence that suggested Williams and McDonnell both understood that
Williams's intent was to receive a greenlight for research studies of Anatabloc).

" McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371 (2016).
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events and meetings."
In his appeal to the Fourth Circuit, McDonnell's primary contention
regarding the verdict was that the instructions to the jury" resulted in an
application of the law that was impermissibly broad.5 ' The jury instructions
drew language from the federal bribery statute prohibiting public officials
from "receiv[ing] anything of value 'in return for . . . being influenced in
the performance of any official act."'5 7 The appellate court approved the
jury instructions, particularly the far-reaching provisions including
customary actions outside the scope of official duties, so long as the
purpose of the action was to influence matters before the government.1 8
Furthermore, the official act need not be a singular action nor directly
within the public official's control to satisfy the statute."
B. HistoricalDevelopment of "Official Action"
Before turning to the contemporary conception of official action, it is
worthwhile to explore the historical underpinnings of modern corruption
laws. Anticorruption efforts are deeply rooted in United States history,
dating all the way back to the Articles of Confederation, which banned
officials from receiving any gifts from foreign powers.o This absolute
prohibition on gratuities was an effort to curtail potential corrupting
influences because the then dominant international powers, France and
Britain, were perceived as failed and corrupt states.6 In fact, a modified
version of that same provision would appear in the Constitution as the
' McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 6772486, at *4.
ss See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2015) (reciting the jury
instructions: "The term official action means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit,

proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before
any public official, in such public official's official capacity. Official action as I just defined it includes
those actions that have been clearly established by settled practice as part of a public official's position,
even if the action was not taken pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law. In other words,
official actions may include acts that a public official customarily performs, even if those actions are

not described in any law, rule, or job description. And a public official need not have actual or final
authority over the end result sought by a bribe payor so long as the alleged bribe payor reasonably
believes that the public official had influence, power or authority over a means to the end sought by the
bribe payor").
6
ld. at 506.
" Id. at 505 (citing 18 U.S.C § 201(b)(2) (2012)).
ss See id. at 509 (citations omitted) (stating that customary actions are included when the aim is to
"influence a question [or] matter... that may be brought before the government").
9

Id. at 509-10.

TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 20 (quoting a passage from the Articles of Confederation banning
the acceptance of any gifts and noting how many at that time viewed it as extreme).
" See id. at 18-19 (explaining the two contemporary views among Americans towards Britain
and France, where Britain was regarded as a "failed ideal," the result of private interests corrupting a
6

sound government and France was seen as a "civic cesspool" where politicking was premised on
corruption).
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Emoluments Clause: "[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust
[the United States], shall, without the consent of the Congress,
under ...
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever,
any
accept
2
from any King, Prince, or foreign State."6 The anticorruption sentiment at
the constitutional convention was so strong that delegates lobbied to have
the provision carried forward, albeit modified to include congressional
63
approval, to be ratified as part of the Constitution. The strong sentiment
against gift-giving at that time is in stark contrast to the modern political
and legal environment where political gifts and corporate campaign
contributions are now viewed as protected speech."
65
Through the twentieth century, two federal statutes, the Hobbs Act
66
were employed by federal
and the mail and wire fraud statutes,
6
prosecutors to crack down on state level corruption. ' Neither of these
statutes were written with combatting public corruption in mind, especially
at the state level.68 The mail and wire fraud statutes were interpreted to
provide citizens with an intangible right to the honest services of their
public officials.69 This intangible right could be described as the right of
citizens to a good government, free from corruption. Those critical of it
would decry it as the quintessential definition of vagueness due to the
subjective nature of terms like "corruption" and "good government."o
However, the creative interpretations made by zealous federal prosecutors
61
63

Id. at 27 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8).
See id. (discussing how delegate Charles Pinkney moved to have the gift prohibition

reinserted).
' Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 349-50 (2010) (overturning federal
statute prohibiting electioneering communications of corporate immediately before an election and

stating, "[i]f the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or
associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech" because "political speech cannot be
limited based on a speaker's wealth [as] a necessary consequence of the premise that the First

Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker's identity").
65 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b)(2) (2012) (defining extortion as "the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under

color of official right").
" Id. § 1346 (expanding the definition of fraud in 18 U.S.C.
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services").

§

1341 to "a scheme or artifice to

67 The federal "hook" allowing the prosecution of state public officials under the Hobbs Act is the
effect, even potential or de minimis, on interstate commerce, whereas the mail and wire fraud relies on
the use of U.S. Postal Service or private interstate carriers. PETER HENNING & LEE RADEK, THE
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION 7-9, 128-31, 143, 145-56 (2011) (providing an
overview of the constitutionality and history of mail fraud and wire fraud statutes and the Hobbs Act).
61 See id. at 107, 143-44 (stating that the Hobbs Act was passed in response to the Supreme

Court's decision in United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942), which refused to
extend the Anti-Racketeering Act to actions of unionized truckers whereas the mail fraud statute was
created to prevent the post office from being used to facilitate interstate lotteries).
69 TEACHOUT, supranote 1, at 197.
" See id at 199 ("Defendants repeatedly objected to the uncertainty at the margins of [mail fraud
charges]. If there was no actual impact on the public, how could there be a crime? They objected to the
idea that there was something lost when the loyalty of a public servant was lost.").

1310

CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1299

were blessed by the federal courts.71 The Court would ultimately begin to
curb its expansive reading of the mail and wire fraud statutes to alleviate
the vague and subjective nature of its application.
In McNally v. United States,7 2 the Court limited the application of the
mail fraud statutes to situations where individual property rights are
infringed.73 The Court invited Congress to clarify the statutes, criticizing
the statutes' vagueness.7 4 in response, Congress amended 18 U.S.C § 1341
to specifically include the "intangible right of honest services," effectively
reverting the statute to its construction before McNally.75
C. The Expansive Interpretationof "Official Action" Under United States
v. Birdsall
In United States v. Birdsall," a unanimous Court promulgated a
sweeping definition of "official action" that reached beyond statutory
duties of a public official to include customary actions and
recommendations to government officials regarding their exercise of
official authority.7 7 While the framework surrounding the definition in
Birdsall is slightly different because of evolving statutes, it does provide
insight into how the Court's rationale has progressed.78 With greater
emphasis on intent, the exact boundaries of "official action," formerly
referred to as "official duty," did not have to be so narrowly defined.7 9 The
scope of the "official action" was less important, so long as the individual
sought to influence the "official action."" Therefore, "[e]very action that is
within the range of official duty comes within the purview of these
n Id. at 197-200 (discussing how federal prosecutors employed the mail fraud statute to convict
two New Orleans Levee Board members who utilized their positions for private financial gain in
Sushan v. UnitedStates, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941)).
72438 U.S. 350 (1987).
n Id. at 360 ("Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries

ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good
government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property
rights.").
74 id.
7s Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402 (2010) (internal citations omitted) ("Congress
responded swiftly. The following year [after McNally v. United States was decided], it enacted a new
statute 'specifically to cover one of the "intangible rights" that the lower courts had protected ... prior
to McNally. . . .').
1 233 U.S. 223 (1914).
17 See id at 230-31, 235-36.

" See id. at 230 (citation omitted) (reciting the bribery statute which includes "with intent to have
his decision or action on any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may at any time be
pending").
'9 See id. at 230-31 (discussing how the intent to influence "official action" is more important
than whether the statute circumscribed the action).

.

o See id. at 230 (citation omitted) ("'[W]hoever ... in any official capacity' . . . accepts money.
'with intent to have his decision or action ... influenced thereby' shall be punished. . . .").
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sections.""1 In addition to the statutory definition of "official action" and
the official duties of a public official, the Court included activities that
were performed by custom and tradition by an elected official.8 2
Contrasting the definition of "official action" under Birdsall with the
recent McDonnell opinion reveals that the emphasis of the Court as well as
Congress has shifted away from the intent of the gift giver towards what
action the gift recipient takes.83 In the McDonnell case, there was no
question that Williams sought to influence Robert McDonnell-Williams
testified that the gifts were given to secure McDonnell's support of
Anatabloc. 84 The Court did not appear interested in establishing what
Governor McDonnell's intent was when receiving gifts even though
inferences of misconduct were readily available." Under Birdsall, this case
would almost certainly have resulted in a conviction because of the more
expansive definition of "official action" and the focus on the intent of the

public official."
D.

"Official Action" Narrowing Under United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers

The Birdsall definition of "official action" would remain unchanged
until the Court revisited it in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers.87 in
another unanimous decision, the Court refused to adopt an expansive
interpretation of the federal bribery statute's definition of "official act,""
fearing that it would criminalize gift-giving without an official act."
Therefore, under the new definition, the prosecutor had to show more than
" Id.
82 See id. at 231 ("[Official action] might also be found in an established usage which constituted
the common law of the department and fixed the duties of those engaged in its activities.").
8 Compare id. at 231 ("In numerous instances, duties not completely defined by written rules are
clearly established by settled practice, and action taken in the course of their performance must be
regarded as within the provisions of the above-mentioned statutes against bribery."), with McDonnell v.

United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371-72 (2016) ("In sum, an 'official act' is a decision or action on a
'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.' The 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding
or controversy' must involve a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a
lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee.").

" McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366 ("Williams testified that he had given the gifts and loans to the
McDonnells to obtain the Governor's 'help with the testing' of Anatabloc at Virginia's medical

schools.").
" See id. at 2364 ("On February 16, Governor McDonnell e-mailed Williams to check on the
status of documents related to the $50,000 loan. A few minutes later, Governor McDonnell e-mailed

his counsel stating, '[p]lease see me about Anatabloc issues at VCU and UVA."').
8
87
8
8

See supra Section I.C.

526 U.S. 398 (1999).
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012) (defining the term "official act").
See Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 405-06 (specifying that differentiating factor between

bribery and mere gratuity is the connection between the donor's contribution and his or her intent to

influence a specific future official action).
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just the intent to stockpile goodwill for some future matter in order to
prove there was an "official action." 90 The Court in Sun-Diamond
accompanied its adoption of a more narrow standard with dicta stating "it
would be quite possible for a jury to find that the gift was made 'for or
because of' the person's anticipated decision."'
This further clarified the Court's holding that bare gift-giving is
insufficient to support a bribery conviction unless the gifts were given in
anticipation of a specific future official act.92 However, it still must be
noted that bare gift-giving will have a corrupting influence. 93 This
influence should be appreciated and factored into the statutory definition of
"official action."
Zephyr Teachout criticized the Court's interpretation, stating "[t]he
opinion shows a lack of understanding of the corrosive power of gifts and
subtle influence, and no appreciation for the need for clear rules, because
of the difficulty of proving connections between gifts and acts."94 SunDiamond Growers laid the groundwork for McDonnell by the Court's
wholesale rejection of a bright-line test and reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 209.9'
The Court reasoned that Congress's intent not to broadly define official
action "as a prohibition of gifts given by reason of the donee's office is
supported by the fact that when Congress has wanted to adopt such a
broadly prophylactic criminal prohibition upon gift-giving, it has done so
in a more precise and administrable fashion."96 The deficiency of that
argument, however, is that the bribery statute is not aimed at preventing
unilateral gratuities, it is aimed at preventing gifts given in exchange for

" See id. ("[The prosecution's construction of official action] would be satisfied, according to the
instructions, merely by a showing that respondent gave Secretary Espy a gratuity because of his official
position-perhaps, for example, to build a reservoir of goodwill that might ultimately affect one or
more of a multitude of unspecified acts, now and in the future ... In our view, this interpretation does
not fit comfortable with the statutory text .... ).
91 See id. at 408 (providing the example of an individual pending appointment to the Antitrust

Division of the Department of Justice receiving an impermissible gift from a large software corporation
whose merger relies on that individual's later approval as a gift made in anticipation of a decision).
9

Id at 406 ("The insistence upon an 'official act,' carefully defined, seems pregnant with the

requirement that some particular official act be identified and proved.").

9 See Alix Spiegel, Give and Take: How the Rule of Reciprocation Binds Us, NPR (Nov. 26,
2012, 4:49 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2012/ 1/26/165570502/give-and-take-howthe-rule-of-reciprocation-binds-us [https://perma.cc/ZAD7-E6ZW] (identifying the effects of the rule of
reciprocation as obligating individuals to return favors, even when unsolicited and providing the
example of restaurant servers who place a mint with the check receiving 3.3% higher tips).
9 TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 228.

9s See 18 U.S.C.

§ 209(a) (2012) (prohibiting government employees

from collecting any salary in

addition to that provided by the U.S. government).
9 See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1999) (internal citations
omitted) ("For example, another provision of Chapter 11 of Title 18, the chapter entitled 'Bribery,
Graft, and Conflicts of Interest,' criminalizes the giving or receiving of any 'supplementation of an

Executive official's salary, without regard to the purpose of the payment."').
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some official act, therefore clearly defining the requisite quid pro quo.97
II. DEFICIENCIES WITH

THE McDONNELL COURT'S DEFINITION OF

"OFFICIAL ACTS"

'

The Supreme Court recently recognized that its opinion in McDonnell
is unlikely to sit well with the electorate.98 However, instead of expanding
its reading of the federal anticorruption statutes to capture political
corruption, the Court interpreted the language narrowly to hedge against
unrealized fears.99 During oral argument in McDonnell, Justice Breyer
offered a hypothetical in which Mrs. Smith, a constituent facing eviction,
petitions her representative for assistance.i'o In this hypothetical, the
representative, in response to the constituent's letter, reaches out to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development or Department of Health
and Human Services asking what can be done to help Mrs. Smith.' 0
Situations like Justice Breyer's hypothetical occur every day
throughout the country-it is a fundamental tenet of representative
democracy that constituents may petition their representatives for
redress.' 02 The issue with characterizing McDonnell's actions as similar to
those of Mrs. Smith is that Mrs. Smith did not pay her representative to
hear her claims. By not capturing this key distinction, the Court failed to
account for the realities of human nature. Through the unilateral exchange
of money, from Williams to the McDonnell family, a pervasive bias and
indebtedness would take root, tainting the decision-making process of
0
After such
McDonnell with respect to matters relating to Williams.io
point, McDonnell would be unable to act in a completely impartial manner.
Furthermore, McDonnell is not merely helping a concerned constituent,
but rather he is engaging in an implicit quid pro quo exchange in which he
received loans and lavish gifts from a wealthy businessman who believed
" See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(a) (2012) (emphasis added) (defining the prohibited conduct as
"[whoever] directly or indirectly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official,

former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act
performed or to be performed by such public official").
9 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016) (concluding the opinion with
"[t]here is no doubt that this case is distasteful; it may be worse than that").

" See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-19, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)
(No. 15-474) (expressing concerns about bribery statutes curtailing the responsiveness desired in a
representative democracy).
0
o Id. at 15-16.
...
Id. at 15-17.
102 U.S. CONST. amend I; see McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373 (emphasis in original) ("The basic
i

compact underlying representative government assumes that public officials will hear from their
constituents and act appropriately on their concerns. . . .").
103 See TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 54 (explaining how structural dependency, where one party
relies on monetary support from the other, causes the recipient to "align himself with the desires of the
person who had power over him").
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"

McDonnell would help ensure Anatabloc research.

A. Public Officials Should Not Be Permitted to Accept Monetary Gifts
Due to Their Corrupting Influence Because of Psychological
Tendencies to Reciprocate
Simply put, the norm of reciprocity states that individuals will seek to
complete a quid pro quo transaction when provided the quid half of the
transaction."o' The norm of reciprocity is deeply ingrained in individuals,
with its effects registering as early as three to four years old. 0 6 This effect
has been studied in numerous situations, but perhaps nowhere more wellknown than in the "Christmas Card Studies." Originally performed in
1974,107 researchers mailed 578 Christmas cards to a random sample of
individuals without any request for a response or prior notice.'0 o Out of that
sample, approximately 20% of recipients responded by sending a
Christmas card of their own.1 09 Some individuals responded with detailed
handwritten letters or long-distance telephone calls."0 Research has failed
to replicate this effect in recent years, but that decline has been attributed
to modern computer communications and individuals becoming
increasingly skeptical of unsolicited mailings."' One aspect of the
Christmas card study that is particularly telling is that there is no pressure
for one to reciprocate-one can easily throw away the piece of mail
without opening it. Even if they do open it, the card does not compel a
'"See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361, 2366 (2016) (showing that Williams
approached McDonnell seeking his assistance starting Anatabloc research at Virginia's medical
schools).
"o See Gouldner, supra note 17, at 175 (describing that the reciprocity norm is a "flexible moral
sanction" that can be applied to "countless ad hoc transactions" and even likening it to an "all-purpose
moral cement").
'" See Kristina R. Olson & Elizabeth S. Spelke, Foundations of Cooperation in Young Children,

108 COGNITION 222, 223, 229 (2008) (observing that children are inclined to share resources with
friends and family more than with strangers, indicating that the reciprocity norm is applied by toddlers
as young as three).
107 Phillip R. Kunz & Michael Woolcott, Season's Greetings:From My Status to Yours, SOC. SCI.
RES., Sept. 1976, at 269, 269.
`o Id. at 270 tbl.1.
09 Id

at 272 tbl.2 (showing the distribution of response proportions which when averaged yield

approximately 20% response rate with higher quality cards eliciting a 30.2% response rate compared to
moderate card's 10.8% response rate).
no See id. at 270-71 (transcribing responses from the anonymous recipient, one who described his

efforts to identify the sender: "Your last name did not register at first, so I had my niece stop on her
way to California to call you and ask if you were Dr. Ralph's daughter. . . Please forgive me for being
so stupid for not knowing your last name. We are fine and hope you are well").
". See Brian P. Meier, Bah Humbug: Unexpected Christmas Cards and the Reciprocity Norm,

156 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 449, 451 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2015.1129306
[https://perma.cc/L2CK-UPWS] (finding that only 2% of individuals reciprocated by sending a card in
return but self-reporting of participants stated that individuals were suspicious of unsolicited mail and
preferred to use e-mail).
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response.'1 2 This is significant because Williams was much more
aggressive in seeking McDonnell's reciprocal behavior of supporting
Anatabloc research-including one on your Christmas card mailing list is a
far cry from permitting one to use your Ferrari and vacation home."13
Directly asking an individual to reciprocate, especially by identifying the
value sought,1' 4 amplifies the norm of reciprocity by obligating the
receiving party to aid in some future situation."'
As private interest groups and lobbying has grown more prevalent,
there has been greater interest in researching the potential effects of
lobbying.' 16 Research that aimed to reconcile the numerous studies
exploring the effects of lobbying and donation identified several situations
where the decision making of an elected official is more susceptible to
influence.17 Many of these factors are present in the relationship between

Williams and McDonnell regarding the studies of Anatabloc."' Williams
lobbied McDonnell to assist in obtaining research from the University of
Virginia."' Politically speaking, the research of Anatabloc is a technical,
low visibility, non-partisan, and apolitical research initiative.1 20 Therefore,
it presents a situation where McDonnell would have been particularly
susceptible to the influence of lobbying, even without factoring in the
McDonnells' precarious financial situation.121
One overarching aspect of the relationship between Williams and the
McDonnells was the near constant flow of money or expensive luxury
goods from Williams to the McDonnells. With the McDonnells' rental
properties in Virginia Beach failing, they needed influxes of cash to pay
the rental-property mortgages, for which Robert McDonnell turned to
Williams.1 22 For example, one text message from Robert McDonnell to
112

Id. at 449.

"' See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361, 2366 (2016) (describing how Williams
actively sought McDonnell's reciprocal assistance).
114 See Gouldner, supra note 17, at 171-72 (describing two distinct measurements of equivalence:
heteromorphic reciprocity, which involves the exchange of different goods of similar value, and
homeomorphic reciprocity, where like goods are exchanged).
.1s See id at 174 (mentioning how conformity to each other's expectations rises when one half
performs their obligation).
116 Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress, LEGIS. STUD. Q., Feb. 1995,
at 89, 89-91 (describing how the volume of lobbying and private interest group action in the U.S.
Congress has driven research on the effects of lobbying).

"7 1d. at 94-95.
11 Id

" McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361, 2366 (2016) ("Williams testified that she
had given the gifts and loans to the McDonnells to obtain the Governor's 'help with the testing' of
Anatabloc at Virginia's medical schools.").
120 Smith, supranote 116, at 94.
121 See supra footnotes 20-31 and accompanying text.
122

Indictment at 9, United States v. McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 6772486 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1,

2014) (No. 3:14-cr-00012-JRS).
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Williams read, "[p]er voicemail would like to see if you could extend
another 20K loan for this year. Call if possible and I'll ask [my brother-inlaw] to send instructions."1 23 Furthermore, while arranging the first loan,
Maureen McDonnell explained the financial difficulties they were facing
and offered to help Star Scientific. 124 From exchanges such as this, it would
have been apparent to Williams that the McDonnells were dependent on
his financial assistance. According to Teachout, "[one of the most
dangerous structures, one that was likely to lead to corruption, was the
dependent one." 2 5
B. McDonnell's Ability to Influence Decisions Outside of Official Action
is Enhanced by his Role as Governor
One typical role of governors is to serve as the state leader by
spearheading policy initiatives and serving as the chief executive of a
state's various agencies and departments. 126 As Governor, Robert
McDonnell was in a greater position to influence the policy decisions of
the executive branch because of his supervisory role. 127 Psychologists have
revealed that individuals are susceptible to authority figures' influence
with a recent study reaffirming the conclusions of Stanley Milgram's
obedience study.1 28 That psychological study found that 70% of

23

124 Id. at 27.
1 Id. at 8-9.
125 TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 53.
126
See
Governors'
Powers

and
Authority,
NAT'L
GOVERNORS
https://www.nga.org/cms/home/management-resources/governors-powers-and-authority.html

Ass'N,
[https://

perma.cc/ZN8R-AK76] (last visited Jan. 11, 2017) (providing an outline of governors' duties
generally).
127 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2016) ("Hicks-Thomas recalled Governor
McDonnell asking them to meet with a representative from Star Scientific."); see Jerry M. Burger,

Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 1, 8 tbl.2 (reaffirming
classic Milgram obedience study by showing that 70% of participants would continue administering
electrical shocks to punish students after hearing the person cry out in pain if instructed to do so thus
demonstrating the increased influence authority figures have over subordinates).
128 Stanley Milgram, The Perils of Obedience, HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 1973, at 62, 62-63 ("In the
basic experimental design, two people come to a psychology laboratory to take part in a study of
memory and learning. One of them is designated as a 'teacher' and the other a 'learner.' The
experimenter explains that the study is concerned with the effects of punishment on learning. The
learner is conducted into a room, seated in a kind of miniature electric chair; his arms are strapped to
prevent excessive movement, and an electrode is attached to his wrist. He is told that he will be read

lists of simple word pairs, and that he will then be tested on his ability to remember the second word of
a pair when he hears the first one again. Whenever he makes an error, he will receive electric shocks of
increasing intensity.... The teacher is a genuinely naive subject who has come to the laboratory for the
experiment. The learner, or victim, is actually an actor who receives no shock at all. The point of the
experiment is to see how far a person will proceed in a concrete and measureable situation in which he
is ordered to inflict increasing pain on a protesting victim... . The manifest suffering of the learner
presses [the teacher] to quit; but each time he hesitates to administer a shock, the experimenter orders
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participants would continue shocking an individual who was in pain so
long as the person administering the experiment called for it.1 29 An even
stronger indication of obedience stems from the 63.3% of participants who
chose to continue administering electrical shocks after an actor who had
assisted them in administering the electrical shocks backed out, at which
point they would be encouraged to continue by another assistant in the
experiment. 130 Even though, as the Court held in McDonnell, Robert
McDonnell did not take official action, his role as Governor can be
analogized to that of the experimenter in Milgram's experiment instructing
subordinates to administer electrical shocks.' 3
Even without exercising his authority through an "official action,"
McDonnell's influence surely would have been felt by subordinates
through his actions. For example, McDonnell directed subordinate public
officials to investigate and question researchers about Anatabloc.' 32 At
times, McDonnell conspicuously advocated for the Anatabloc supplement,
occasionally going so far as to recommend that other public officials meet
with Star Scientific representatives.' 33 This cash-for-influence is
impermissible and its corrupting effect cannot be ignored because the
influence did not travel through an "official action."
III. COMPARING IN-OFFICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE
EXPENDITURES

A. Campaign Finance Contributions are More Transparent to the
Constituency
Technology has ushered in a new era of transparency; whether it be a
WikiLeaks document released on the Internet or footage from policeofficer body cameras, there is a higher expectation of transparency among
citizens. For example, one of the benefits touted by supporters of
implementing body cameras is the increased level of transparency by

him to continue. To extricate himself from this plight, the subject must make a clear break with
authority.").
129 Burger, supra note 127, at 8 tbl.2 (showing that 70% of the control group, with no pressures to
continue or stop, continued after believing they had administered a 150-volt shock to the learner).
130

1d. at 7-8, tbl.2.

' Milgram, supra note 128, at 62-63.

132 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2363-64 (noting that at times Governor McDonnell asked
researchers "whether or not there was any reason to explore [Anatabloc] further" and after receiving

Williams's complaint of slow progress asked his counsel to "[p]lease see me about Anatabloc issues at
[Virginia Commonwealth University] and [University of Virginia]").
133 See id. at 2364, 2366 ("The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Virginia's health plan for
state employees. At that time, Governor McDonnell was taking Anatabloc several times a day. He took

a pill during the meeting, and told Hicks-Thomas and Wilson that the pills 'were working well for him'
and 'would be good for' state employees.").
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allowing the public to review police encounters. 34 Transparency provides
the information that leads to accountability, which is crucial for an
effective democracy.1 35 One of the distinctions between campaign finance
contributions and in-office contributions to elected officials is the level of
transparency.
Campaign finance reporting laws have three main requirements:
contribution limits per donor, restrictions on who may be a donor, and
mandated campaign finance disclosures."' This enables the constituency to
make an informed decision at the ballot box. Applying the reporting
requirements of campaign finance laws would serve a similar function by
providing the constituents with information about gifts. Another benefit of
channeling gifts made to public officials through a structure similar to
campaign finances is that it would provide a permissive channel for
politicians to receive the money. In addition to the reporting requirement,
states should strive to create an oversight agency to collect and enforce it.
For example, the Connecticut Office of State Ethics fosters transparency
by providing enforcement of disclosure requirements and by collecting a
"Statement of Financial Interests" from public officials. 3 1
Critics of expansion of federal prosecution of corruption worry that
doing so will usurp the ability of states to administer their own criminal
corruption statutes.' 38 However, anticorruption values are deeply rooted in
the Constitution and cannot be so easily laid aside. 9 Professor Peter J.
Henning writes, "[v]iewing federal prosecution of state and local officials
for corruption as an invasion of state authority would turn the values
advanced by federalism on their head."' 40 The use of federal anticorruption
laws to prosecute state officials is needed because anticorruption laws for

'1
See LINDSAY MILLER & JESSICA TOLIVER & POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM,
IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 5

(2014) ("The police executives whom PERF consulted cited many ways in which body-worn cameras
have helped their agencies strengthen accountability and transparency.").
'3 See Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS

OF JAMES MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) ("A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy .... Knowledge
will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.").
136 See HENNING & RADEK, supra note 67, at 316 (listing common requirements of campaign

finance laws).
' CONN. OFFICE OF STATE ETHICS, http://www.ct.gov/ethics/site/default.asp [https://perma.cc/
KE7D-LQBC] (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
138 See George D. Brown, McDonnell and the CriminalizationofPolitics, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1,7-8

(2017) (outlining the federalism concerns associated with expansion of federal corruption prosecution).
139 See supra Section I.B.
'" Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the FederalProsecution ofState and Local Corruption, 92

KY. L.J. 75, 86 (2003) (arguing that federalism protects states from infringement by the federal
government but does not limit the application of federal criminal law to state public officials).
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elected officials vary state by state.1 4 1 In the wake of McDonnell's
indictment, Virginia lawmakers enacted much-needed ethics reform
laws.1 4 2 However, prior to enacting this legislation Virginia did not cap the
amount of money a public official could receive as a gift nor did it have an
official ethics commission. 143 Furthermore, the state ethics laws only
required reporting of gifts greater than fifty dollars given directly to the
public official, allowing friends and family to accept gifts without any
reporting requirements whatsoever.'"
Due to the loose ethics laws in Virginia, McDonnell was not indicted
on any state law violations and, in light of his successful appeal, will not
face any federal charges.1 45 The situation in Virginia, up until its recent
ethics reform, signifies that there needs to be a minimum standard to
ensure transparency.1 46 Federal bribery statutes are well situated to police
corruption at the highest levels of state government because they set
47
Minimum
minimum standards and are separate from local politics.1
standards would have no effect on states that already have robust ethics
statutes but would have been valuable for pre-McDonnell Virginia where
Robert McDonnell's corruption did not actually violate any state laws.1 48
B. Regulation of Campaign Finance Creates Structural Barriers to
Corruption
One crucial distinction between campaign finance laws and
anticorruption statutes is that the former create structural barriers while the

141 See TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 108-18 (2014) (providing an overview and critique of states'
patchwork of legislative attempts at curbing corruption).
142 Davis C. Rennolds, Let's Get Ethical, A Look at the New Ethics Reform in the Commonwealth

of Virginia, 19 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 1, 2 (2015) (discussing how the Virginia General Assembly
recently passed ethics reform legislation).
143d. at 8.

'" Id
145

Brianna Ehley, McDonnell Says He Feels Vindicated by DOJ Dropping Corruption Case,

POLITICO (Sept. 9, 2016, 2:57 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/bob-mcdonnell-doj-dropscorruption-case-227964 [https://perma.cc/VB5J-7W4T] ("[T]he Justice Department announced they
would not pursue another public corruption case against [McDonnell].").
'" See Rennolds, supra note 142, at 8 ("Prior to the 2015 reforms, Virginia was one of only ten
states that allowed elected officials to accept personal gifts of unlimited value.").
Wn See TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 121 (explaining that it can be difficult to indict local
politicians with state anticorruption statutes because state-level prosecutors' careers may be tangled up

with local politics); Michael W. Carey, Larry R. Ellis & Joseph F. Savage Jr., FederalProsecution of
State and Local Public Officials: The Obstacles to Punishing Breaches of the Public Trust and a

Proposalfor Reform, Part One, 94 W. VA. L. REV 301, 354-55 (1991) (arguing that there is a need for
Federal prosecution in state-level corruption because of the number of cases brought by federal
prosecutors).
'" See Ehley, supra note 145 (reporting that the Justice Department would not reopen its
corruption case following the McDonnell decision).
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latter seek to punish corrupt intent. 14 9 By way of an historical example, the
transition from the public ballot, where politicians, political parties, and
sometimes even landlords would provide a ballot to citizens eligible to
vote, to a private ballot is an example of a structural change.`0 The public
ballots would be conspicuously colored so enforcers could monitor the
voting area and be able to identify which candidates individuals voted for
in order to ensure bought votes were actually cast.'"' Adoption of the
private ballot system, where ballots are uniform and printed by the
government, is an example of a structural change because it criminalizes
behavior deemed likely to corrupt and provides little guidance for
politicians.15 2
Conversely, the statutes at play in McDonnell, the mail and wire fraud
statutes and the Hobbs Act, require a showing of corrupt intent."'
Furthermore, the Court in McDonnell stated that "[a] jury could, for
example, conclude that an agreement was reached if the evidence shows
that the public official received a thing of value knowing that it was given
with the expectation that the official would perform an 'official act' in
return." 5 4 The issue with corrupt-intent laws is their subjective nature,
which leaves individuals to decide what is corrupt."' This is further
complicated because not all individuals view every instance of corruption
as being per se wrong-especially with increasingly complex bureaucratic
structures, public officials may be tempted to cut corners.' 6

'49 See TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 183-84 (comparing structural- and corrupt-intent laws).

See id. at 178-79 (describing the transition from public to private balloting).
See id. (noting that in Massachusetts in 1878 the Republican Party printed ballots on bright
pink paper to enable enforcers to see the ballots from great distances).
52
1 Id. at 178-80, 184.
' McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012)
1so
151

("The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear, or under color of official right."); 18 U.S.C.

§

1341 ("Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
.

obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises ...
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do . .
'11 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371.
's5 See Colin Leys, What Is the Problem About Corruption?, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION:
READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 31, 33-35 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed., 1970) (criticizing
corruption definitions for being subjective, often with the political insiders feeling their actions were

justified on one side and "ethical absolutism" on the other).
"'See id. at 34-35 (identifying "honest graft" and "petty bribery" as cases where individuals
might be inclined to view conduct, though technically corrupt, as innocuous). A hypothetical assists in
identifying this distinction. For example, assume that a citizen, who wants the bridge he commutes over

every day to be repaired because it is riddled with potholes, gives a public official cash asking if this
project can be prioritized. In response, the public official makes sure the highway repair crews are
dispatched the next morning to fix the issue. Many would view this behavior as corrupt, but others may

justify it on the grounds that the public official's actions benefit the constituents at large. Furthermore,
even fewer people would likely view this behavior as corrupt if the public official did not do anything
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Due to the subjective nature of the Hobbs Act and mail and wire fraud
statutes requiring corrupt intent the McDonnell court should have
interpreted "official action" expansively to encompass all official and
customary duties public officials perform, thus reverting the definition to
its status under Birdsall.'57 Doing so would broaden liability for bribery
and extortion to capture the subtlest exercises of a public official's power
such as influencing other public officials or setting up meetings. In doing
so, the application of the law would shift closer to the structural nature of
campaign finance laws by creating barriers to dissuade public officials
from acting corruptly."' Instead of requiring an "official act," almost any
action of public officials could be captured with a broader definition
because the corrupting nature of money is the root issue.159 Without the
personal loans and gifts, Robert McDonnell was attempting to help a
constituent and could be looked at as a successful example of a public
official responding to and assisting a constituent.'o Furthermore, the risks
of excluding this behavior from the definition of "official action" are even
greater where the public official holds a high ranking position. The
corrupting influence of money in McDonnell is amplified because Robert
McDonnell's position as Governor enhances his influence over
subordinates because individuals are more likely to acquiesce to authority
'

figures.16

C. PoliticalGift Giving is More Corruptingthan Campaign Contributions
Because Elected Officials Are More Susceptible to the Reciprocity
Norm
At first blush, a gift of money to a public official may appear to have
the same net effect-$1,000 donated to the personal political campaign is
because the constituent was not aware that highway repair crews were scheduled to repair the bridge
the next day regardlessof his contribution.
'" See United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223, 230-31 (1914) (defining a broad range of official
duties that are subject to the anti-fraud statutes at issue in the case).
158 See e.g., HENNING & RADEK, supra note 67, at 316 (describing how campaign finance laws

create barriers in order to dissuade corrupt practices such as contribution limits, donor restrictions, and
disclosure requirements).
1" Samuel Issacharoff, On PoliticalCorruption, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION:
BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 119, 122 (Monica Youn ed., 2011) (noting the alternative view of the Court

on corruption was that large sums of money in politics has a distortive effect on the political
marketplace allowing those with the financial means to outcompete those unable to heavily contribute
financially).
160 See U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law ...

abridging . .. the right of the

people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.");
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016) ("The basic compact underlying
representative government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act
appropriately on their concerns . . . .").
161 See supra Section ILI.B (arguing that empirical research suggests that Robert McDonnell's
subordinates may have felt obligated to acquiesce to his directions concerning Anatabloc).
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no different than $1,000 given as a gift. The two contributions, however,
cannot be equated. On the one hand, in a political campaign, money allows
the candidate's speech to reach more people who may or may not agree
with the message.16 2 On the other hand, direct contributions to incumbent
public officials bear the risk of "clientelism."13 Broadly defined,
clientelism occurs when an individual or entity exerts its influence both
within and outside the political system, resulting in disproportionate
political capital.'" Samuel Issacharoff suggests that clientelism is more
damaging than corrupt campaign contributions and isolated quid pro quo
arrangements because it siphons public resources towards private
interests.' 5 The risk associated with clientelism stems from the political
culture which rewards reciprocity. 166 In other words, after taking public
office, the individual is socialized by his or her environment to more often
engage in reciprocal behavior, thus amplifying the risks associated with
gift-giving. 167
In addition to the risks of clientelism, the psychological effects
associated with in-office gifts to public officials dictate a greater
reciprocity rate. This is because of the temporal relationship between the
gift and the ability to reciprocate. 6 1 In an experiment specifically designed
to test this relationship,' 69 researchers discovered that reciprocity rates
162

See Bradley A. Smith, Campaign FinanceRegulation: Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic

Consequences,

CATO

INSTITUTE,

POLICY

ANALYSIS

No.

238

(Sept.

13,

1995),

https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdflpa238.pdf[https://perma.cc/DR3U-S5Q3]
(identifying the issue with measuring the effects of political spending because well-funded and
successful campaigns may be a result of broad public support or donor belief that the candidate is more
likely to win); see also Stephen J. Dubner, How Much Does Campaign Spending Influence the
Election? A
Freakonomics Quorum, FREAKONOMICS
(Jan.
17,
2012,
9:40 AM),
http://freakonomics.com/2012/01/17/how-much-does-campaign-spending-influence-the-election-afreakonomics-quorum/ [https://perma.cc/S92Y-F27Q] (illustrating that there is a minimum amount of
campaign spending necessary to reach the electorate even though individuals do not change their

political views based on campaign advertisements).
. See Issacharoff, supra note 159, at 124-26 (discussing clientelism).
"Id. at 127.
161

Id. at 124-26 (discussing how the patron-client relationships of clientelism result in a distorted

use of public resources, resulting in private entities reaping the benefits, whereas quid pro quo consists
of a public official receiving unjust private benefits).
'6 Daniel Enemark et al., Effect of Holding Office on the Behavior of Politicians, 113 PNAS
13690, 13693 (2016) ("More specifically, our findings show that office-holding politicians exhibit
more reciprocity than those who ran for office but lost the election. This finding and the null findings
for trust and generosity align with the political science literature that claims that adherence to the norm

of reciprocity is critical for success in politics and that the failure to reciprocate trust is a greater
transgression than the failure to trust.").
167 Id.
16 See Jerry M. Burger et al., Effects of Time on the Norm of Reciprocity,
19 BASIC & APPLIED

Soc. PSYCH. 91, 91 (1997) (exploring the temporal relationship between the reciprocity norm and the
ability to reciprocate).
'69 In the experiment, a student would enter a room with a confederate and an experimenter. The

confederate was disguised as another student participating in the survey. Id. at 94-95. The experimenter
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between the immediate and one-week delayed conditions decreased from
93.8% to 75.8%.170 Other simulated iterations with scenarios involving
more significant favors' 7 ' and with reciprocal requests delayed up to one
year yielded a similar relationship between the reciprocity norm and
time.1 72 This reflects that "the norm of reciprocity does not commit the
recipient to an indefinite obligation to return a favor ... [and] that if favors
are to be returned they should be returned within a reasonable period of
time."l 73 Building off these psychological effects, campaign contributions
and in-office gifts can be distinguished based on the temporal differences.
Presumably, public officials have the ability to act on behalf of the giftgiver with greater immediacy than the political campaign donor.1 74
Furthermore, campaign contributions involve reciprocity in the
abstract, contingent on the success of the campaign. Broadening the
definition of "official action" is only the first step toward reducing quid pro
quo corruption. A comprehensive solution would involve filtering gifts
through a more stringent campaign finance framework. Parts of this
framework should include cooling off periods,'1 75 restricted donor lists,1 7 6
and contribution limits.1 77
would provide both with a personality questionnaire and exit the room. Id While the experimenter was
out of the room, the confederate would excuse him or herself to use the restroom. Id. The confederate
would then return with two cans of Coca-Cola and offer one to the student participant. Id Then, the
experimenter would return and collect the completed questionnaire before once again leaving to get
survey credit participation forms. Id. At this point, the confederate would ask the student participant if
he/she would deliver a manila envelope to a nearby university office. Id. In a modified iteration of the
experiment, the confederate's soda offer and delivery request was separated by a week. Id at 94-95.
7o Id. at 95 tbl.1 (delaying the request for a reciprocal favor for one week).
.7i See id. at 97 ("Briefly, Scenario A describes an encounter in which a student named Doug
spends about 10 minutes helping the participant load several heavy pieces of furniture onto a truck.
Later Doug asks for a ride to his job about 30 minutes away ... . In Scenario B a student named Trisha
lends the participant a few dollars so he or she can join friends for pizza, a loan that is paid back the

next day. Later Trish asks if she can borrow $20 to buy a book for class. Finally, in Scenario C a
student named Martin spends about 15 minutes going over class notes after the participant misses class

because of illness. Later Martin asks if the participant will go to the library to look up and photocopy
eight journal articles for him.").
172 Id. at 99 ("Consistent with our findings from the first experiment, the longer the delay between
the favor and the request, the less likely participants were to say they would return the favor.").
73
1 Id. at 93.
"' This is not to say that there are less risks of corruption stemming from quid pro quo bribery
when the public official is an incumbent seeking reelection. In these situations, the politician's
incumbent status takes precedence over the reelection effort.
175 See e.g., MUN. SEC. RULE BOOK r. G-37(b)(i)(A) (MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD. 2017) ("No
dealer shall engage in municipal securities business with a municipal entity within two years after a
contribution to an official of such municipal entity with dealer selection influence . . . made by the
dealer; a municipal finance professional of the dealer; or a political action committee controlled by
either the dealer or a municipal finance professional of the dealer.").
176 See e.g., HENNING & RADEK, supra note 67, at 330 (describing states' restrictions on donors
where an entire class of donors may be banned from giving money to public officials).
17 See, e.g., id at 318 (describing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's two-tier violation
structure of campaign contribution limits over $2,000 and $25,000).
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

Section I of this Note shows that the conception of corruption has
remained relatively constant from the founding of the United States until
recently, rooted in concepts of morality and curtailed with structural
limitations."' Section II of this Note identified and described some of the
psychological realities that exist in soft, or implicit, quid pro quo
relationships where there is not "official action" in exchange for money,
but rather the sale of influence and access. 7 9 Access to this dual political
structure invites clientelism, which amplifies an individual or entity's
political power. 80 The Supreme Court in McDonnell was limited to
interpreting "official action" and in response to vagueness concerns
construed "official action" narrowly.' Any comprehensive solution aimed
at restricting quid pro quo corruption of public officials will require
legislative action to shift the criminal bribery statutes, with long maximum
sentences,1 8 2 towards a framework of prophylactic measures with fines and
shorter sentences.
A. ProposedConstructionof "Official Action"
The Court's narrow definition of "official acts" creates a large
loophole for corruption to go unpunished so long as the public official did
not plan or take action within the bounds of "official action."' 83 The
hypothetical proposed by Justice Breyer at oral argument serves as a good
example to expose the flawed concept of "official action."' 84 In Justice
Breyer's hypothetical, Mrs. Smith, a constituent facing an eviction notice,
contacts her representative asking if there is any help he/she can provide
her.' 5 In response, the representative writes a letter to the secretary of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development asking for action to be
taken in Mrs. Smith's matter.' 8 6 This is not a crime because there was no

"8 See supra Section I.B.
.79 See supra Section II.

"'8 See supra Section III.C.
...
See United States v. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016) (ruling only on the scope of
"official act" to remedy the "vagueness concerns raised by Governor McDonnell").
182 18 U.S.C § 1951(a) (2012) (carrying a maximum prison sentence of twenty
years); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341, 1343 (listing a maximum prison sentence of twenty years generally with it increasing to thirty
years in limited circumstances involving disaster and emergency aid).
183 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361, 2372 (curtailing the definition of official action to
situations involving the formal exercise of government authority over a specific question).
'" Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-19, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)
(No. 15-474) (raising a hypothetical where a constituent is seeking redress in response to the argument
that the definition of "official action" include an attempt to influence).
185
6

11

Id.
Id. at 15-16.
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What Justice Breyer's
money offered in exchange for that service.
example displays is not corruption but a properly functioning
representative government.' 8 The government has long argued that, in
quid pro quo bribery cases, the mantra "in for a penny, in for a pound"
applies.189 In defense of the narrow reading of "official action," the Court
is worried about the "[g]overnment's boundless interpretation" and the use
of a criminal statute to curtail corruption."' However, a law that has bright
lines, where "official action" encompasses all action taken in government
service, has value in its prophylactic nature by drawing clear lines where
conduct becomes criminal."' Even if potentially innocent activities were
captured by this broad definition, its anticorruption function would be well
served by "changing the incentives before the fact instead of punishing
activity after the fact[]" to dissuade public officials from even accepting
items of value in exchange for government service.' 92 Alongside this much
broader construction, the penalties associated with bribery would need to
be reduced in order to avoid the potential due process violation associated
with a sweeping, vague definition.' 93
B. Sentencing Reforms
Ideally, any broadening of the definition of "official act" should be
accompanied by reforms to sentencing under the bribery statute. The Court
is concerned with the potentially limitless application of anticorruption
laws.' 94 Hobbs Act extortion and the mail and wire fraud statutes each
carry a maximum statutory penalty of up to twenty years' imprisonment or
a fine or both.' 95 The hefty maximum sentences may explain some of the
Court's reluctance in affirming in anticorruption cases. Maximum
sentencing guidelines should be reduced to eliminate some of the Supreme

187

See TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 217 (listing the first element of bribery as "giving a thing of

value or a benefit").
' See id ("A constant flow between the public and a candidate is supposed to exist in a
representative democracy, because that ensures that the representative will be thinking of the best
interests of her constituency.").

" Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No.
15-474).
190 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372, 2375 (2016); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 31-32, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474) ("And it's not
because I'm in favor of dishonest behavior. I'm against it. And we have just listed some that is
dishonest. My problem is the criminal law as the weapon to cure it.").
191 See TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 4-5 (describing structural anti-corruption measures).
192 Id. at 4.
193 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373 (discussing the Court's concern with sentences up to fifteen
years when the statutory language does not provide clear bright lines).
1"

See id. at 2375 (expressing concern with the "broader legal implications of the Government's

boundless interpretation of the federal bribery statute[]").
195 18 U.S.C § 1951(a) (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
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Court's reluctance.'
This change would enable courts to identify
corruption as corruption instead of just being "distasteful."' 9 ' Therefore,
maximum sentences should be reduced or graduated with the value of the
goods accepted to remove the Court's hesitation towards upholding
convictions.'"
Coupled with an expansive definition of "official action," reducing
maximum sentences based on value would incentivize public officials to
avoid accepting anything of value. The criminalized behavior would shift
from accepting a thing of value in exchange for a narrowly defined
"official action" towards criminalizing the acceptance of a thing of value
for any action within a public official's purview. Exceptions for de
minimis gifts would prevent the absurdities of public officials facing
corruption charges for "the President to host a championship sports team at
the White House, the Secretary of Education to visit a high school, or the
Secretary of Agriculture to deliver a speech to 'farmers concerning various
matters of USDA policy."'19 Additionally, an ethics oversight agency
could provide case by case guidance to public officials. 2 0
Lastly, public officials receiving gifts in kind could be protected by a
safe harbor allowing them to accept the gift but requiring that perishable
gifts are placed in a common area of the office.201 When the gift's value
exceeds the de minimis exception, the public official would then have the
option of refusing the gift or accepting it on behalf of their organization
and later purchasing it for the gift's fair market value if they desire to
personally keep it.202

'9' Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)
(No. 15-474) (outlining concerns with the application of a criminal statute to remedy political
corruption).

" See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375 (discussing the ambiguity in "official action" with the
maximum sentences as a potential due process violation).

-9 See id. at 2373 (internal citations omitted) ("Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn
someone to prison' for up to 15 years raises the serious concern that the provision does not comport
with the Constitution's guarantee of due process.").
'
200

Id. at 2370 (internal citations omitted).
Legal Opinions, Rulings and Enforcement Actions, CONN. OFFICE OF STATE ETHICS,

http://www.ct.gov/ethics/cwp/view.asp?a=3488&Q=414904&ethicsNav-j44061|
[https://perma.cc/
TD8M-B3X4] (last visited Mar. 9, 2017) ("Any person subject to the Code of Ethics for Public
Officials or the Code of Ethics for Lobbyists has the right to request an advisory opinion. Until
amended or revoked, the opinions are binding and, if relied upon in good faith by the requestor,
constitute an absolute defense to a criminal allegation of a Code violation.").
201 See e.g., 930 MASS. CODE REGS. 5.08(11) (2017) ("A public employee is not prohibited from
accepting unsolicited gifts of items that are perishable or otherwise impractical to return (such as

flowers, plants, floral arrangements, and fruit baskets, or boxes of candy) if such item is made generally
accessible to other persons in the employee's agency and to the general public to the extent possible, or
given to charity.").
202 See e.g., Olga Oksman, The Gifts of the Presidents, ATLANTIC (Feb.
15, 2016)
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/the-unusual-gifts-given-to-presidents/46283 1/
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CONCLUSION

Robert McDonnell's trial revealed that corruption is alive and well in
state-level politics. Corruption is and will always be a constant temptation
facing public officials and steps will need to be taken in order to limit the
incentives for corrupt behavior.20 3 Before McDonnell, for example, the
railroad barons of the nineteenth century engaged in quid pro quo
corruption with state officials who accepted shares of the company in
exchange for the wholesaling of state land for pennies on the dollar to the
railway. 2 0 Steps need to be taken in order to limit the incentives for this
corrupt quid pro quo behavior. One such avenue is the criminalization of
quid pro quo corruption; however, the narrowed definition of "official
action" fails to appreciate the psychology underpinning the relationship. As
this Note lays out, the nature of humans and the risk of quid pro quo
corruption does not support an explicit definition of the transaction.
Furthermore, if one understands corruption as the supplanting of the public
interest with a private interest, then psychologically, the gifts provided by
Williams to the McDonnell family are inherently corrupting. Therefore, the
Court should have appreciated that effect by defining "official acts" to
broadly include the actions in civil service that may fall outside "official
action."

[https://perma.cc/77JZ-QEET] (discussing how Hillary Clinton opted to purchase a black pearl
necklace given to her while serving as Secretary of State).
203 See TEACHOUT, supra note 1, at 47 ("Corruption cannot be made to vanish, but its power can
be subdued with the right combination of culture and political rules.").
204

See id. at 125-43 (discussing two seminal corruption cases in Tennessee and Illinois); see e.g.,

Alison Leigh Cowan & Stacey Stowe, Former Top Deputy to Rowland is Indicted in Racketeering
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/24/nyregion/former-top-deputy("Describing
to-rowland-is-indicted-in-racketeering-case.html? r-0 [https://perma.cc/8QVY-EZGF]
the former Connecticut governor's office as a racketeering enterprise, a federal grand jury yesterday

indicted former Gov. John G. Rowland's co-chief of staff and others in a scheme that involved the
manipulation of tens of millions of dollars' worth of state contracts, grants and loans in return for gold,

cash, limousine rides, trips and other valuables."); Paul Von Zielbaurer, BridgeportMayor Convicted
2003),
20,
(Mar.
N.Y.
TIMES
of
Corruption,
Charges
on
16
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/20/nyregion/bridgeport-mayor-convicted-on- 16-charges-ofcorruption.html [https://perma.cc/7DK7-2LHV] ("A federal jury today convicted Mayor Joseph P.
Ganim of Bridgeport of racketeering, extortion, bribery and mail fraud, among other felonies, for his
role in a six-year scheme to shake down city contractors for more than $500,000 in cash, meals,
clothing, wine and home renovations.").

